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1. Introduction 
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant claims that 
there is only one unconditionally demanding moral law or categorical im-
perative (CI) (G 4:421, 4:436)1. Nevertheless, he distinguishes several 
(kinds of) formula’s of CI: (i) the formula of a universal law (FUL): “act 
only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421)2, (ii) the formula of 
humanity as end in itself (FH): “so act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as 
an end, never merely as a means” (G 4:429)3, (iii) the formula of 
autonomy (FA): “to act only so that the will could regard itself as at the 
same time giving universal law through its maxim” (G 4:434)4, and (iv) 
the formula of the realm of ends (FRE): “act in accordance with the 
maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom 
of ends” (G 4:439)5. In summarizing his account of CI, Kant repeats his 
claim that these different “ways of representing the principle of morality” 
                                                                            
1  All page references are to I. KANT, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later: 
German) Academy of Sciences, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900– . Used abbreviations: Ak: Academy 
edition, CPR: Critique of Pure Reason, CPJ: Critique of the Power of Judgment, G: Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals, LE: Lectures on Ethics, LPR: Lectures on the Philoso-
phical Doctrine of Religion, MM: The Metaphysics of Morals. All translations are taken from 
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer & Allen W. 
Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995–.  
2  See also G 4:402, 4:434, 4:437, 4:438; MM 6:389; LE 27:469.  
3  See also G 4:433, 4:436, 4:437, 4:438; MM 6:236, 6:410, 6:462.  
4  See also G 4:431, 4:432, 4:440, 4:447; LE 27:469. 
5  Alternatively: “Every rational being must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a law-
giving member of the universal kingdom of ends” (G 4:438). 
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are to be seen as “only so many formulae of the very same law”, but at the 
same time he adds that “there is nevertheless a difference among them” (G 
4:436). This difference concerns the fact that FRE implies a “complete 
determination” of CI referring to the harmonization of “all the maxims 
from one’s own lawgiving [to] (‘zu’) a possible kingdom of ends” (G 
4:436).  
In this paper we assess the notions of intentionality, normativity and 
communality in Kant’s ‘realm of ends’. We first argue that FRE reveals 
not only the commonly acknowledged deontological nature of Kant’s 
‘practical reasons’ ethics, but also its essentially teleological nature, i.e., 
its intentional commitment to ends, secondly that FRE, by uniting FUL, 
FH and FA, grounds a social and communal morally normative practice, 
and thirdly that FRE requires us to take up an auto-reflexive as well as an 
intersubjective stance in evaluating the moral legitimacy of one’s inten-
tions and (inter)actions.  
 
2. Intentionality 
Let us first analyse what Kant understands by a ‘realm of ends’, as it 
will allow us to revaluate the teleological dimension —here understood as 
the intentional commitment to ends— of Kant’s so-called deontological 
ethics. Kant defines the ‘realm of ends’ (‘Reich der Zwecke’) as “a whole 
of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as 
ends in themselves and the ends of his own that each may set himself)”, 
and adds that “all rational beings stand under the law that each of them is 
to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the sa-
me time as ends in themselves”. This leads to “a systematic union of ratio-
nal beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which can 
be called a kingdom of ends (admittedly only an ideal) because what these 
laws have as their purpose is just the relation of these things to one 
another as ends and means” (G 4:433). 
The ‘realm of ends’ is not merely the union of all rational beings as 
‘ends in themselves’, i.e., as ‘persons’ having an incomparable, absolute 
and ‘inner’ worth instead of a merely comparative ‘price’, but also of “the 
ends of his own that each may set himself”. This ‘double’ sense of the 
‘realm of ends’ is crucial, but is sometimes understated or misconceived 
even by influential authors such as Rawls (2000) and Hare (1963)6. Thus, 
                                                                            
6  Rawls takes the ‘realm of ends’ as expressing the idea of a “moral commonwealth” in which 
we view ourselves as equal “legislators […] of the public moral law”, but as such leaves out 
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the ‘realm of ends’ has a twofold sense for it concerns not only the syste-
matic connection of all rational beings, but also the systematic connection 
of all their ends. By the latter, Kant refers to those ends that can be called 
‘morally legitimate’, i.e., ends that are directly entailed by the moral law 
(‘ends as duties’) or ends that are at least not contradictory to or incon-
sistent with the moral law. In this ‘broader’ sense, the ‘realm of ends’ does 
not by definition exclude the striving for non-moral ends as long as these 
do not interfere or conflict with the moral law. In the ‘stricter’ sense, the 
ends involved are those that necessarily belong to the ‘realm of ends’ be-
cause they can be approved and pursued by a community of rational self-
legislators. Taking these approaches together, the ‘realm of ends’ requires 
both “the exclusion of ends that in principle cannot be shared between ra-
tional beings” and “the furthering of ends that unite people (such as those 
involving mutual respect and mutual aid)”7. 
Furthermore, Kant claims that the laws of the ‘realm of ends’ have as 
their purpose “just the relation of these things to one another as ends and 
means” (G 4:433). What could this mean? Just as Kant argues in the third 
Critique that ‘organized beings’ have to be judged as ‘natural ends’, 
whose parts “are possible only through their relation to the whole” (CPJ 
5:373), meaning that “each part is conceived as if it exists only through all 
the others, thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of 
the whole” (CPJ 5:373f), rational beings can only form a ‘realm of ends’ 
insofar as their ends harmonize into a ‘system’, i.e., insofar as their 
purposes are both mutually consistent and reciprocally supportive, and 
hence result in a single unified teleological system. As Wood argues, “a 
‘realm’ requires a harmony […] of ends so that the ends of all can be 
pursued in common”8. 
                                                                            
the second part of Kant’s idea, i.e., the unification of all morally legitimate ends. S. J. RAWLS, 
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 
204. Hare interprets the ‘realm of ends’ as “the liberal’s ideal” of “a good society” in which the 
“ends and interests of all are given equal consideration”, but downplays the necessity of a sys-
tematicity and totality of all morally legitimate ends, which is essential to Kant’s ‘realm of 
ends’ (see further below). See R. M. HARE, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963, p. 179. For accurate accounts, see e.g. J. H. ZAMMITO, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique 
of Judgement, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992, p. 319; A. W. WOOD, Kant’s Ethical 
Thought, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 166; and P. GUYER, Kant, London 
& New York: Routledge, 2006. 
7  WOOD, o.c., 1999, p. 169. 
8  WOOD, o.c., 1999, p. 166.  
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In sum, the peculiarity of FRE lies in the fact that it reveals an 
explicitly intentional commitment to ends, and moreover a duty to strive 
for a harmonious unification of all morally legitimate ends. As such, FRE 
unites as it were both Kant’s deontological and teleological ethics, i.e., 
Kant’s ethics as a system of duties and ethics as a system of ends. As Kant 
states in his Metaphysics of Morals (Doctrine of Virtue): “Ends and duties 
distinguish the two divisions of the doctrine of morals in general. That 
ethics contains duties that one cannot be constrained by others […] to 
fulfill follows merely from its being a doctrine of ends, since coercion to 
ends (to have them) is self-contradictory” (MM 6:381). It is precisely in 
FRE that deontology and teleology become intertwined. Therefore we now 
turn to FRE’s normative dimension and its connection to the teleological 
dimension of CI. 
 
3. Normativity 
Kant calls the ‘realm of ends’ an “ideal” (G 4:433; 4:462) rather than 
an “idea”. While the latter can be defined as a concept of pure reason, an 
“ideal” concerns the “representation of an individual being as adequate to 
an idea” (CPJ 5:232), or “the idea not merely in concreto but in individuo, 
i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable […] through the idea 
alone” (CPR A:568; B:596). Although being a determinable individual 
thing, an ideal stands like an ‘archetype’ (‘Urbild’) that completely deter-
mines its copies: “just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal […] serves as 
the original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy” (CPR 
A:569; B:597). In this respect, Kant mentions the ideal of the stoic sage as 
an exemplar designing an image of complete conformity with the idea of 
wisdom. Thus, while virtue is an idea of reason generating rules for moral 
judgment, the stoic sage is an ideal serving as a unique standard or model 
to shape our moral conduct: “we have in us no other standard for our ac-
tions than the conduct of this divine human being, with which we compare 
ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even 
though we can never reach the standard” (CPR A:569; B:597). Likewise, 
the ‘realm of ends’ can be interpreted as the only ideal of reason with 
which to compare our human relations and interactions: it serves for de-
signing a vivid image of what would be a perfect social moral practice, 
the concept of which is “complete in its kind, in order to assess and 
measure the degree and the defects of what is incomplete” (CPR A:570; 
B:598).  
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Moreover, Kant also assesses the ‘realm of ends’ in terms of a “prac-
tical idea” by opposing it to the ‘realm of nature’9. Kant makes it clear that 
the former concerns not “a theoretical idea for explaining what exists”, but 
rather “a practical idea for the sake of bringing about, in conformity with 
this very idea, that which does not exist but which can become real by 
means of our conduct” (G 4:436, footnote). Hence, it is obvious that Kant 
takes the ‘realm of ends’ as a normative or constructive idea of practical 
reason to model the natural world as it ought to be. Further, Kant argues 
that, while the ‘realm of nature’ is only possible on the basis of heterono-
mous laws of “externally necessitated efficient causes”, the ‘realm of 
ends’ is merely possible through autonomous maxims, i.e., “rules imposed 
upon oneself” (G 4:438). As Kant puts it in his lectures: “If I picture to 
myself a kingdom of natural things, […] then that is the kingdom of nature 
under heteronomy. But I can also picture a kingdom of purposes with 
autonomy, which is the kingdom of rational beings, who have a general 
system of ends in view. In this realm, we consider ourselves as those who 
obey the law, but also as those who give laws.” (LE 29:629).  
Yet, Kant does not only oppose the ‘realm of ends’ to the ‘realm of 
nature’, but also contends that the former has to be conceived “by analogy 
with” the latter. This analogy can be interpreted in a twofold way. First, 
from a general point of view, the analogy concerns the fact that while the 
‘realm of ends’ is governed by laws of freedom and the ‘the realm of 
nature’ is governed by mechanical laws of causality, both display a kind 
of basic universal lawfulness —be it deterministically or intentionally. Se-
condly, in light of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, the ‘realm of 
ends’ can be conceived by analogy with the ‘realm of nature’ provided 
that the latter be judged as a teleological unified system rather than as a 
merely mechanical aggregate10. Just as the whole of nature has to be 
judged as mutually cooperative in producing the ultimate end of nature 
(culture), the ‘realm of ends’ has to be understood as an archetypal world 
wherein all rational beings cooperate in order to establish a practically 
reason-based a priori end, i.e., the harmonious consistency of all morally 
legitimate ends. This analogy leads us back to the teleological dimension 
of Kant’s ‘realm of ends’, which we discussed above, i.e., its commitment 
                                                                            
9  It remains puzzling why Kant assesses the ‘realm of ends’ alternatively in terms of an “ideal” 
(G 4:433; 4:462) and a “practical idea” (G 4:436, footnote) and how this twofold assessment is 
to be understood.  
10  On Kant’s interpretation of ‘system’ versus ‘aggregate’ see especially the First Introduction to 
the Critique of the Power of Judgment (Ak 20:203, 20:206, 20:208-9, 20:247-248). 
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to establish such a harmonious consistency. Combined with the normative 
dimension of the ‘realm of ends’, it becomes obvious that FRE expresses a 
demand to act from moral laws (FRE’s normative dimension) and with an 
explicit commitment to realise a harmonious unification of rational 
lawgivers and their morally legitimate ends (FRE’s teleological 
dimension). In the following section we argue that this demand can only 
be fully appreciated if the communal and intersubjective dimensions of 
Kant’s FRE are explicitly taken into account. 
 
4. Intersubjectivity and Communality 
As already mentioned, Kant relates FRE to the “complete determi-
nation” of CI with which all maxims have to comply, stipulating “that all 
maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize [to] (‘zu’) a possible 
kingdom of ends” (G 4:436). As Kant argues, FRE unites both (i) the form 
of the maxims consisting in their universality, so that maxims have to be 
chosen as if they held as universal laws, and (ii) the matter or absolute end 
of the maxims, which is related to the demand that the rational being as 
end in itself has to serve as the limiting condition of all merely relative 
ends (G 4:436). Obviously, form and matter refer to FUL and FH res-
pectively. However, FA is also incorporated into FRE as is proven by 
adding “from one’s own lawgiving”. By connecting FUL, FH and FA to 
one another in FRE, the latter resists any merely formalistic approach of 
Kant’s CI. Moreover, FRE expresses a supplementary communal dimen-
sion that is not made explicit by FUL, FH and FA separately. As Johnson 
emphasizes: “The intuitive idea behind this formulation [FRE] is that our 
fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn 
acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an 
equal share in legislating these principles for their community”11. 
Kant connects this differentiation between form, matter and complete 
determination to a ‘quantitative’ progress from ‘unity’ of the form of the 
will and ‘plurality’ of the matter of the will to ‘allness’ or ‘totality’ in FRE 
(G 4:436). Understanding the nature of ‘totality’ reveals an important, 
though often neglected aspect of Kant’s ethics. In the first Critique 
                                                                            
11  R. JOHNSON, ‘Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kant-moral, § 8. Retrieved on December 6, 
2007. Or, as Kant says: “For it is only insofar all rational creatures act according to these 
eternal laws of reason that they stand under a principle of community and together constitute a 
system of all ends” [italics added] (LPR 28:1100).  
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“allness” or “totality” is defined as “nothing other than plurality consi-
dered as a unity” (CPR B 110-1), which amounts to saying that totality 
exists in a kind of harmony of plurality in unity. FRE requires that a 
plurality of both rational beings as ‘ends in themselves’ and of their par-
ticular —morally legitimate— ends is brought into harmony under formal 
unifying principles of pure practical reason. Hence, FRE once again re-
veals its essential ‘social’ or ‘communal’ dimension: it is only in and 
through a ‘realm of ends’ that a universal valid law can be found for a plu-
rality of rational agents united in an ideal moral community.  
Let us further consider the significance of membership in the ‘realm 
of ends’. The specificity of FRE lies in the fact that it extends the function 
of autonomy and dignity as principium executionis for executing one’s 
moral actions to all rational subjects as members of a moral community. 
Such membership ‘guarantees’ that the autonomous will can serve both as 
its own and as a universal law: the common laws uniting rational beings in 
a ‘realm of ends’ have to be laws that are equally valid for and equally 
recognized by all members, which is only possible if all members are 
lawgiver of as well as subject to these laws. Further, FRE unites rational 
beings through moral laws regulating their reciprocal relations as ends 
and means. This implies the claim that only if one presupposes of oneself 
and of all others —insofar as these are affected by the actions of one ano-
ther— that they do not only have their own personal ends, but also possess 
the capacity to and the interest for universal (self)legislation, a systematic 
connection of all morally legitimate ends is possible. Hence, it is guaran-
teed that all involved agents are capable of abstracting from their par-
ticular ends and of constructing a universally valid and universally 
acceptable maxim so that a harmonious unity of all ends can be realized12. 
Furthermore, the culmination of the formula’s in FRE implies that a 
‘realm of ends’ is so regulated that, in striving for particular purposes, 
each member as a universal lawgiver never restricts other members to do 
the same: each member has to take into account his own perspective and 
at the same time the perspective of the other members as equal self-legis-
lators13. For this reason, Guyer speaks of the ‘realm of ends’ as “a system 
                                                                            
12  See also P. GUYER, ‘The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative’, in Paul Guyer (ed.), 
Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1998, pp. 238-239: “[…] only in a community all of whose members see 
themselves as universal legislators and not just as pursuers of individual ends will there always 
be some maxim that is indeed not only acceptable to but well motivated for all.”  
13  See also A. W. WOOD, Kant, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 141-142. 
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of freedom, in which all agents freely pursue their freely chosen ends to 
the extent compatible with a like freedom for all” [italics added]14. Hence, 
by establishing a totality of a non-conflicting unity of common substantive 
ends, i.e., the valuation of each other as end in itself, amidst a plurality of 
particular relative purposes, FRE once again resists any merely blindly 
universalistic or merely auto-reflexively individualistic approach of Kant’s 
CI15. 
Finally, the communal applicability of CI gains greater plausibility 
because FRE entails that the whole of all the subjects’ maxims (plural!) 
has to fuse into a ‘realm of ends’, i.e., that all the subjects’ maxims taken 
together have to be universalizable. This demand to construct a universa-
lizable system of maxims is again reinforced by the fact that in conceiving 
such a system the moral agent “must always take his maxims from the 
point of view of himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgi-
ving beings” [italics added] (G 4:438). FRE demands from every rational 
subject to construct an encompassing corpus of universalizable maxims 
viewed from the pluralistic diversity of perspectives of all involved, 
equally lawgiving members of the community. Hence, FRE not only 
requires an auto-reflexive but also a communal and intersubjective stance 
in evaluating the legitimacy of one’s (inter)actions and intentions —
although it has to be acknowledged that Kant silently passes over the 
question of how this intersubjectivity effectively ought to take place16. 
 
5. Conclusion 
FRE grounds (the possibility of) a communal moral practice and thus 
reveals several subtle dimensions that —historically speaking— have so-
metimes been downplayed in focussing exclusively on FUL and —as a re-
sult of this— in portraying Kant’s CI as rigorously formalistic and one-
                                                                            
14  P. GUYER, ‘Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)’, in Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy, 1998 / 2004, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT9. Retrie-
ved on December 6, 2007. 
15  See also Thomas W. Pogge, ‘The Categorical Imperative’, in Paul Guyer (ed.), o.c., 1998,       
p. 202: “In deliberating what maxim I may adopt, I am to ask which maxims I would make 
universally available, if it were my task to legislate so as to guarantee unity and harmony 
among a plurality of (human) persons […] involved in the pursuit of their self-chosen ends” 
[italics added]. 
16  This issue is tackled by e.g. Habermas in his ‘discourse ethics’. See especially J. HABERMAS, 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by C. Lenhardt and S. Nicholson, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. 
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sidedly deontological17. It is therefore necessary to fully appreciate Kant’s 
assessment of CI in terms of FRE, especially since Kant himself took the 
‘realm of ends’ to be the ultimate basis of his views on morality. As he 
argues in the Groundwork, “morality consists, then, in the reference of all 
action to the lawgiving by which alone a kingdom of ends is possible” (G 
4:434), or, as he strikingly puts it in his Lectures on Philosophical Theo-
logy, “morality is an absolutely necessary system of all ends, and it is just 
this agreement with the idea of a system which is the ground of the 
morality of an action” (LPR 28:1075)18. 
 
                                                                            
17  See also P. GUYER, o.c., 1998 / 2004, http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT9: 
“Traditionally, Kant has been seen as an ethical formalist, according to whom all judgments on 
the values of ends must be subordinated to the obligatory universality of a moral law derived 
from the very concept of rationality itself.” 
18  The authors would like to thank the Special Research Fund of Ghent University and the Fund 
for Scientific Research-Flanders for their financial support.  
